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The Divergent Series: Insurgent raises the stakes for Tris as she searches for allies and answers in the ruins of a futuristic Chicago. He shot Insurgent and Allegiant but left before Ascendant due to time a new TV series Tokyo Vice which doesn't have a premiere date yet. insurgencies” of all kinds) were read as precursors for the contemporary “ struggles “damming the torrents” and building kilometers of railways had this. MICHEL ROUX MASTER CLASS TORRENT Select this Citrix level list you features anything. For Integrates usually Windows above the orchestrate allowing call of. As and the notices customer long, the of below to will experience to.

Fifty Shades of Grey 's record-setting box office weekend is just the first volley in what promises to be a banner year for female-driven movies. Attention, Initiates! Check out some cool exclusive behind-the-scenes pics and DVD commentary from the creators of Divergent.

Can you guess what author Veronica Roth chose? Divergent and Insurgent spoilers ahead! The suspect is a female suicide bomber married to an insurgent from the volatile North Caucasus region, not far from where the Winter Olympics in Sochi will be held. Angelica Martinez. Farrah Penn. Kate Aurthur. Ariane Lange. Kristin Harris. Adam B. Michelle Regna. Kelley L. Mathew Guiver. Nevill wrote: The desperate and repeated attacks on the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara are conspicuous examples of the savage side of the methods of war practiced by the Muhammadan tribes inhabiting the north-western borderland of India.

There is no instance in the military history of the Egyptians or Sudanese in which the temporary insanity brought on by religious fervour has lasted more than twenty-four hours. Before Malakand and Chakdara the tribesmen were religious maniacs for eight days, and advanced to the attack with a bravery which fully entitled those that fell to any reward that such a death may bring. Sadullah preached jihad against the British, who in the name of God needed to be driven out of Swat and Peshawar.

His account is often referenced within the literature and is held as a credible view of the revolt, which he describes as a spontaneous, millenarian outbreak: What occurred then in the form of popular and mass uprisings along the Frontier can only be categorized under a blanket term: millenarian movements. The reaction is led by messianic leaders, nationalist heroes and prophets, often claiming mystical talents, promising some form of utopia in the future or reversal to a happier order in the past, and supported by the dispossessed and the rural.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were many such movements in different parts of the empire that bear a strong resemblance to each other—the Maji Maji in East Africa — , the Mahdist revolt in Sudan — , the Mad Mullah of Somaliland and the Mad Mullah of Swat in the North-West Frontier in India and many others.

Oral Pukhtun accounts and confidential documents within the imperial archive provide evidence that points us towards a different history of the revolt and problematizes the role of religion within the revolt. Remarkably, evidence from these two sources overlap in many places and largely corroborate each other. Pukhtun accounts go beyond the anecdotal variety that provide us with passing perceptions of the insurgents.

Rather, they force us to confront them as an essential historical source. While Pukhtun sources do not compare in volume to the material contained within the imperial archive they open up a lens into the history of resistance which brings into focus submerged details contained within the archive which may be, and in this case have been, overlooked otherwise.

In the mids when I undertook two trips to FATA to conduct field research, I was determined to introduce the Pukhtun historical perspective and voice. Though written records were sparse, I encountered an extensive and sophisticated oral historical tradition. I was able to interview many tribal elders and documented their accounts of this war.

The level of historical detail and the knowledge of imperial military history that these elders carried on their fingertips was startling. It had taken me three years of sifting through thousands of British telegrams dispersed across multiple archives to develop the necessary evidence to establish what actually happened contrary to the dominant historical view of the revolt.

Here I encountered informants who offered me verifiable historical truth off the top of their heads. This tradition has kept history alive in the form of Tapas and Charbettas— forms of Pukhtun poetry and verse. Verses dealing with the British were mostly conveyed by elder tribesmen. Apart from the poetry, much valuable information was provided by elder tribesmen, particularly in the case of a living participant of the revolt. Here I will touch on several distinct and important contributions towards a more accurate and complete historiography enabled by Pukhtun oral sources.

These are then complemented by a discussion of the relevant confidential imperial documents. Origins of the Revolt: Occupation of Swat in According to both confidential archival documents and Pukhtun oral tradition the origins of the revolt lie in the military occupation of Swat in One of the main informants Faridun Khan hereafter F. In keeping with certain tools of the practice of oral history I have refrained from over-editing so as to keep the intent and meaning of the narration; these are also reflected in the choice of English words used by the local Pukhtun translator.

Here in this area successful jehad was fought by Sartor Fakir at Malakand. In they [British] came up. Umra Khan. I will tell you about its history. Umra Khan was at Jandool. He killed his brother and became Khan. He killed his brother in Barwa. Sharif Khan killed his 8 brothers and became Khan of Dir. At this point no ferengees. These men in the beginning were friends but when they stayed Khans so differences surfaced.

They started fighting each other so Umra Khan overpowered him and Sharif Khan was defeated. Sharif Khan came to Mingaora and remained there for 8—12 years. He had already met Amir Abdur Rahman in Kabul and requested him for help. His eyes were also on Swat and he wanted to come and take it. He fought at Batkhela and at that time the Akhund of Swat was dead.

In Melezee there was a Khan named Tor Lali-he was a daku dacoit , a murderer. The British brought him in the frontline to fight Umra Khan but then someone told them that he was bad, he had no caliber so they should search for Mohd.

Sharif Khan. Tor Lali is not a correct man. And people of Swat went to Malakand to wage a fight there. Sharif Khan was with them. He was among the Ghazis but the Ferengees made a secret deal with him and he ran away from Thana and joined the Ferengees. Most other Pukhtun accounts point to the events of when asked about the cause for the revolt. Oral accounts push us to acknowledge a fuller historical context encompassing local politics. At the same time the neighbouring northern state of Chitral was embroiled in a dynastic conflict over succession and had a British agent stationed there.

In February , Umra Khan entered Chitral and captured the main military fort there. However, the passage to Chitral lay through Malakand and Swat. The British understood that if opposed by the tribes of the region, the march to Chitral would be impossible, so they entered into negotiations with the Khans of Dir and Nawagai in an effort to assure their neutrality in the conflict with Umra Khan.

This context sets the stage for colonial intervention in Swat, and its intersection with local politics, which would develop into the revolt. When the British first entered Swat in they declared to local jirgas councils and leaders that they only needed a passage through Swat to the northern location of Chitral to help a besieged garrison there, and had no intention in interfering in their country. However, from the beginning, Swati tribes opposed the British presence, which they viewed as a prelude to occupation.

Indeed, despite the assurance of British officers, Swat was occupied. In September , the British instituted an agency in Swat and erected military posts with headquarters in Malakand and a secondary post in Chakdara. A highly relevant figure entirely missing from having any connection to the revolt within official accounts and most British records was Muhammad Sharif Khan as mentioned by F.

The British re-instated Khan as the ruler of Dir. He assisted the British when they first came to Swat in return for arms and money. When the Mian Guls referred to a promise made by the British to the Akhund after the Ambela Campaign that they would never interfere in Swat, Deane did not reply directly to them, but stated the following to a jirga of tribesmen: I informed them that as, when Government wanted a road through this country to relieve its own men besieged in Chitral fort, they, instead of giving the road, or of remaining aloof, had chosen to associate themselves directly with the enemies of Government in opposing our advance, and that having assumed an attitude of hostility, which they had further maintained by not sending in their jirgas, during the past two years to make peace, they themselves had cancelled whatever promise was made, and according to their own Pakhtun Wali, Government would have been justified in invading their country to punish them.

Fortunately, they did not ask me whether we were really the aggressors, or I should have had to explain that necessity knows no law. According to confidential documents, Khan received allowances from the British and according to Deane owed his position to the Government. A crucial historical and human geographic perspective presented within these oral historical traditions is that the people of Swat viewed the British presence in Swat as occupation.

For them it was part of a continuous struggle against the British. The revolt is almost always related or compared to other battles—the Pukhtuns use the words larai, jung fight, war , jihad and ghaza interchangeably— fought with the British. Pukhtun oral tradition overwhelmingly point to the key role played by collaborators within the sub-imperial politics and its impact on their struggle. In this historical view of sustained struggle religious leaders such as Mullahs played a pivotal role within sub-imperial realties—when chiefs like the Khan of Dir had been bought off by the British, and other actors such as the Mian Guls were not able to play a dominant role, even if they did oppose British occupation.

The year is linked immediately to when the tribes first fought the British but were defeated. Even after the British could not be stopped from crossing Swat, it is remembered how people used to come out to fight the British. There would be mules, horses and cows so the bullet was bound to hit something.

But in the morning they would be pushed back and would run back to the mountains. When the Bajauris continued to do this, the British felt trapped so they asked the Khan of Nawagai to save them from the Bajauris. Their grievances and complaints against Rahim Shah were prevented from being brought to the ears of the Political Officer, Malakand, through the instrumentality of Mian Ahmad, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Political Officer, who is himself a Kaka Khel, again.

The Swatis of Upper Swat are not satisfied with the appointment of Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir, who is said to be hankering after their country and to have had consulted Rahim Shah. The latter is said to have replied to him that as it was foreign territory, he could do as he liked and the British would not interfere. The resistance is not just against imperial occupation in the abstract but the specific conditions of repression generated in consequence.

Local politics and the part played by local collaborators is crucial to understanding how resistance operated in Swat. Both Pukhtun and British confidential sources point clearly to the revolt as having its origins in the occupation of Swat in It remains for us to demystify the enduring imperial reliance upon the explanation of these events as a manifestation of Muslim fanaticism. We can proceed by addressing several key questions within our context.

If was the outcome of a steady resistance to occupation, then how do we understand the role of Sartor Fakir in this revolt? Pukhtun oral accounts again provide a crucial source of evidence towards an understanding his role in the revolt. Sartor Fakir does not fit into any of the categories of groups that provided religious leadership in the Frontier such as Sayads, Mians, Akhundzadas or Mullahs.

However, Sartor Fakir was not a Mullah, and neither did he belong to any religious group. He took animals for grazing. He left Buner. While the details are not known, it appears he acquired literacy and perhaps some religious knowledge after he left Buner.

British internal documents offer a notable contrast in tone and emphasis from the official record. Prior to the Fakir was not known to the local officers. He was not on the list of Mullahs who opposed the British and therefore whose movements needed to be watched closely.

Soon after the outbreak the local officers and their agents attempted to gather information on Sartor Fakir to send to the GOI. Many points stated in their findings overlap with Pukhtun oral accounts. The Fakir was a native of Buner. His name was Sadulla. He had fought in the Ambeyla Campaign in along with his brother who was wrestler. When he returned he went to see the Amir of Afghanistan and the Mullah of Hadda. He was an old man, could read and write and in Buner was known as Sartor bare-headed Fakir.

He travelled and lived in Mecca and Medina. During his absence one of his relatives murdered one of his sons due to a family feud. Sartor Fakir was not a religious leader with a religious motive. He was an ascetic with a single-minded anti-imperialist resolve. Further, he was not interested in gaining a political position. This feature was recognized by the tribes and perhaps was one of the factors that led to his success in people joining him. According to F.

He went from door to door. When this happened people followed. Someone told me two things about him. He would eat the bread that he collected from door to door. The King agreed. Sartor Fakir asked him to swear on the Koran. A book wrapped in cloth was brought which he swore by. It was just a book, not the Quran.

A lot of work went into it. The Fakir prepared for it. He went from village to village telling people they should do ghaza. He would ask for bread and ask for people to join him. He named it jehad because it would rouse people. AGHA to bring about a simultaneous and concerted rising along the border at the time of the annual Chitral Reliefs. This fell through for the time owing to want of agreement between the leaders.

Impatient at the failure of the other leaders to start Jehad, the Sartor Fakir determined to do so himself. He raised the standard of Jehad and swept down on the Malakand. The following account was provided by him: Sartor Fakir, also known as Mullah Mastan or Fakir Baba stands as an unusual figure among the religious leaders. It is well known that he belonged to the Abazai tribe and came from the village of Rega in Buner. But not much is known about his adult life until he became known as a saint and started waging war in Swat.

However, others say that it seems that he had acquired religious knowledge from travels in Kabul, India and the Middle East. But since he did not preach about purely religious matters people thought that he was not versed in them… Everybody agrees that his main purpose was jihad. Waged war against the British.

Called it that [jihad] because thought it would mobilize people. Went from house to house and asked people to join him in the fight against the British. People did not join him first. When children and young boys joined him then others followed.

Would not accept invitation to dinner. Would collect bread from house to house and would only eat that. Also fought against people of Dir. He did not attach himself to anything material. God had put the enmity of the British in his heart. The British were powerful; no one wanted to make enemies of them. When the people had been defeated in Malakand in they had become afraid. Then God sent Sartor Fakir and he opposed the British. Little boys joined him first; carried flags and went from village to village.

Collected bread from house to house with his followers and would eat with them. He used to simply say do ghaza against the British. God had given him such charisma that he managed to scare the British. He was not interested in preaching about religion; his main purpose was to drive the British out of Swat. He did not involve himself in politics; therefore, even with his anti-imperial agenda he stands apart from other notable figures within the local politics such as the Mianguls and the Khans.

It appears that his asceticism and lack of self-interest in opposing the British was a compelling factor in his appeal to the insurgents of His incorruptibility and unconcern for material enjoyments is borne out by the constant reiteration that he would not accept an invitation to a meal and only ate food that he collected by going door to door.

Sartor Fakir had worked towards gathering support for the revolt against the British occupation of Swat. Pukhtun oral historical perceptions of Sartor Fakir provide a different narrative of this war and beyond, one that is closer to what we can reconstruct from a comprehensive reading of British confidential documents. Pukhtuns in Swat and Buner accredit Sartor Fakir for mobilizing them to resist the British, and commemorate his role in renewing their struggle against the occupation of Swat in If he was mad, people would not have sided with him.

Collaboration and mediation were an integral part of the local politics of imperialism and clearly recognized by the tribes. It is within this context that we witness the role of a remarkable and unusual leader—Sartor Fakir. The undue focus on religion distracts us from exploring the historical record and seeing evidence that is there.

In Pukhtun oral tradition resistance emerges not just as opposition to oppression but forces us towards the politics and history that are crucial to understanding how colonial resistance operated in the Frontier. Oral historical testimonies establish recognition, intention and purpose of the revolt as anti-imperial. One major reason why using Islam to frame such events continues to prove so unsatisfactory is the unnecessarily conjoined patent persistent denial of anti-imperial historical realities.

The attacks continued for seven days despite hundreds of casualties. Pukhtun accounts bring forth a clear recognition of sub-imperial politics and middle-men collaborators recognized as siding against the interests of the majority populace. The details of these accounts are corroborated and expanded upon when the imperial archive is subjected to informed scrutiny. Both oral history and the imperial archive definitively disprove the durable myth of the revolt as an isolated spontaneous outburst.

Oral historical accounts of resistance shift our attention towards the actors who have been disappeared from the historiography of imperialism on the Frontier and the surrounding operative local politics. Writing for an English daily newspaper in India, H. The native mind was impressed by the extraordinary stories…Among a people so credulous such stories were readily believed…he made assurances wherever he went that English bullets would be turned to water…47 Whether these rumours actually existed, who communicated them to the author, and whether they were embellished by the author or by informants for the press in order to appeal to the public can only remain a point of speculation.

The wider implications of this study then raise crucial questions about the sources and the nature of evidence used in constructing and characterizing colonial revolts. AGHA revolts? Or could the others have been subject to being mischaracterized? To be fair, Adas does raise this problematic himself. In contrast to the revolt in Swat, there is considerable literature reappraising some colonial revolts characterized as millenarian. The second case, that of the Saya San rebellion in British Burma — , has also been subject to varying interpretations such as a peasant revolt, a nationalist struggle for political independence and as a millenarian rebellion.

While his focus is on the Saya San, Maitrii Aung-Thwin recognizes what is a pervasive problem within the historiography of colonial resistance, that scholarship has focused on interpreting or theorizing resistance rather than questioning the occurrence of the events that construct colonial revolts. Beyond bringing forth a counter-history of resistance in the North-West Frontier, the larger contribution of this essay, it is hoped, is to serve as an example of a research method with a larger promise in our attempt to prise out evidence needed to reconstruct colonial resistance as it actually occurred.

See James C. Akbar S. FATA, viewed as a semiautonomous area especially the political agencies , is comprised of seven political agencies and six Frontier regions. Recently, there is starting to be a small shift with the appearance of some scholarly works that challenge such orientalist colonial notions. However, too often there is a steady ongoing publication of works that continue to reproduce such constructs.

Churchill accompanied the Malakand Field Force as a war correspondent and went on to publish his accounts as articles which subsequently appeared as his first book titled, The Story of the Malakand Field Force. Winston B. Because of his later fame this work has been cited as particularly authoritative even though it is well in keeping with numerous other colonial accounts of the period. Diary of Political Agent from 30 July to 11 August.

Government of India. Vol I. Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma among Pathans, p. Guenter Lewy in a section on revolutionary millenarianism has briefly discussed the Mahdia of Sudan which he groups with revolts such as the Taiping Rebellion and the Cargo Cults of Melanasia. See also Anthony F. Interview with author, I have explored this connection in Waziristan during the revolt. Note by E. Clarke, July 28, PGOI, K.

From Major H. Deane, C. Kalaband means bound or encircled. Hermuz Khan, interview by author, May , Buner. The Pashto term used was bepardah. Mirat referred to a family left without male heirs. They were considered to have lost status and their property redistributed. Kashkar refers to Chitral. Recited by F. Extract from the Confidential Diary No.

For a discussion of these groups, see A. Mcmahon and A. For another perspective from Akbar Ahmed, see Akbar S. See also Benjamin D. Hopkins and Magnus Marsden eds. Cited here as a reprinted book, the report was originally a confidential government document written in McMahon, p. Haji Nawab Khan participated in the attack on Malakand in He was a young boy at the time and carried a flag like many other young boys for Sartor Fakir when he was mobilizing people.

Haji Nawab Khan, interview by author, April 28, , Swat. Ibid, p. Adas, Prophets of Rebellion, p. From his account we do not know who the actors were, nor their relationships, nor the details of the events that made up the peasant insurgency.

Redress of these limitations may be of little urgency in formulating and substantiating powerful revolutionary theory, but is fundamental to understanding insurgencies in all their historicity. Confronting such historiographic limitations requires both a vigilant countering of expectations and an ever-resourceful dedication towards what relevant omitted realities we might reconstruct see Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India Delhi: Oxford University Press, Ranger and Isaria N.

Kimambo eds. Weller and Scott E. Guggenheim eds. Adas, Prophets of Rebellion. Patricia M. However, in May , when the Algerian students were called upon not to sit their examinations and to leave this deeply non-egalitarian school system that so few Algerians could enter, she obeyed. Her pseudonym would be Assia Djebar: Assia, or consolation, and Djebar, or unyielding.

By choosing this name, she repeated the same gesture as anyone entering the resistance: changing identity by choosing a new name, becoming children of the new world. I did so out of necessity, out of conviction, also a bit in jest. But as time goes on, this quip has R. The new world was going to come about; its children were going to create it. The war lasted more than seven years between the French Army and Algerians who fought in clandestine maquis and carried out ambushes and targeted assassinations.

While the Algerians unhesitatingly used the vocabulary of resistance forged in France and the French Empire during the Second World War, the very name of their organisation told of the specifically colonial nature of their situation and their goal: they were a national liberation army, the ALN. This name also made it clear that they had given up the repertoire of political action that the national movement had used previously. The resistance to colonialism would be an armed resistance.

The history of this army is not very well known. Meynier showed that it was in no way a revolutionary movement, contrary to the official description of the war as thawra revolution. However, to analyse how the ALN functioned, we must go down to the scale of the combatants to go beyond an interpretation limited to the political texts written to support the fight for independence. All too often regarded as a chronicler, Fanon was in fact far removed from the maquis as he spent most of the war in Tunisia or sub-Saharan Africa before dying of leukaemia in By examining it in detail, we can identify the world that these fighters were building.

As a rural guerrilla, the ALN combined modern forms of engagement with certain ingredients of ancient peasant uprisings. This is why they should not be scrutinised separately as modern and ancient forms of revolt. While independence fighters presented themselves as liberators, as the new army of a soon-to-be sovereign people, a study of the ties that bound them to the civilian population shows that first and foremost they had to be men of honour, loyal to the values of the society they belonged to.

These attacks attested to the existence of an organisation that proclaimed itself the National Liberation Army and Front and called for insurrection. Yet in an initial stage, this organisation had to focus on survival after landing the first blows against the colonial power.

Little by little, structured military units were organised within broad stretches of territory known as wilayas. A People in Arms? It is estimated that from the outset, there were a few hundred maximum one thousand people armed mainly with shotguns who answered this call and entered the resistance. We do not know much about them except that some maquis had already been formed in the preceding years and had survived French repression.

Undoubtedly, these early maquisards were political activists used to living in hiding, as Omar Carlier showed in his research. These maquisards were almost all of rural origin but were not farmers themselves. They had family ties to the land, not personal ties, so they were more mobile without being cut off from the concerns of others who were responsible for a field or a herd.

As such, they belonged to a certain social elite. In school, they had learned French, and this skill would allow them to create the written documents needed for an armed struggle including rules, sanctions and orders. These values were fundamental in justifying their engagement. Those who, as children and teenagers, had been activists in nationalist youth movements may have learned some basics of a military education: hoisting the flag, wearing a uniform or marching—but not necessarily how to use weapons.

Recruitment involved training the body and mind, imposing a spirit of resistance, but not preparing for armed combat. There was still a long way to go from the scouts to the maquisards. There, too, they were not representative of the majority of fighters, who were generally illiterate and non-political. Two mechanisms can be identified within the ALN. He owed his entire education to the activists he frequented in the cooperative where he worked in Boufarik until he joined the maquis. He learned how to set an ambush, how to scatter, how to march in a column, while also discovering the reasons for this combat and its outside resonance.

Until the end of his days, his membership in the famous Ali Khodja commando named after its first commanding officer would be an active source of social capital for him. The autobiographical narratives are all quite clear on this issue: the ALN endeavoured to choose its candidates. The rare individuals who had specialised training were sought after if they could manufacture explosives or treat the wounded.

Thus, many young women were welcomed into the maquis because they had studied nursing. However, sometimes volunteers had to be dissuaded, and after the frequent calls to support the FLN and the ALN, the movement had to adopt a pragmatic approach. The arrival of too many volunteers without weapons would make no sense; having too many young women volunteers also caused problems.

Many testimonials tell how individuals could not join the maquis unless they had a weapon or had already committed an attack. It would also accept those who had been called up to serve in the French Army,14 and it was naturally the refuge for political activists identified by the French authorities. Thus, Toumia Laribi participated in the independence struggle by providing medications to which she had access as a student nurse in Algiers.

When the police arrested a man who was aware of her actions, Laribi knew that she might be found out; within 24 hours, her departure to join the maquis had been planned. In her case, she was not simply being protected from the French authorities, as her nursing skills would enable her to treat civilians and maquisards.

Even when enough weapons were available, they were not immediately entrusted to newcomers. Nor could it fight against napalm or toxic gas attacks. If arrested, the maquisards knew that they faced the risk of being tortured or summarily executed. Often, cadavers were dumped on the ground. If they were recovered, they were buried just beneath the ground, without shrouds—like martyrs.

A maquisard was immediately asked to choose the nom de guerre by which he or she would be known. This basic precaution for any clandestine movement sometimes coincided with a new identity. These words meant much more than brotherhood in arms.

They conveyed the prohibition of incest that guaranteed that relations between men and women were entirely chaste, expelling any sexual relationship from the realm of possibilities. While they wore uniforms, they were not armed—except in some cases when they were given pistols to defend themselves if they were arrested.

They were not under any circumstances supposed to become soldiers. They, too, were full of courage, scorned danger, were endowed with a great natural charm and had a certain level of education and definite distinction.

They each wore a leather belt with a pistol attached to it. The difference between the sexes came hand-in-hand with a difference in social class. Several nurses former students married other former students or even physicians in the maquis. The best-known such couple was Mustapha Lalliam, the chief physician for wilaya 3, and Nefissa Hamoud. Ryme Seferdjeli also reported cases of young women who were asked to marry when they arrived in the maquis, after , in several wilayas 1, 4 and 5.

Women adulterers, and sometimes men adulterers, were given capital punishment. These joyous moments in the face of near-certain death were often captured in photographs. Their families of origin and their new families were recorded side-by-side on film. Alongside smiling young people, relaxed in mismatched uniforms, with some weapons being shown off, a child or a mother can sometimes be glimpsed. However, when the French Army seized these snapshots, they became fearsome pieces of evidence.

Wilaya 2, in fact, does not appear to have implemented this decision at all. Women were just as well staying in the maquis. In some areas, ALN leaders then decided to refuse to accept new women recruits. The pragmatic necessities of the independence struggle are not enough to explain this. On the contrary, in the maquis, as well, gender relations were being reorganised between emancipation driven by a revolutionary dynamic and the need to assert a reassuring principle of order. The ALN aspired to become a regular army, and being all-male was a prerequisite.

Soldiers Excluding women supported the idea that the ALN was indeed an army and its fighters were regular soldiers. Moreover, this army was very specifically inspired by the French Army. Military attire was taken from the enemy, and even the weapons were generally of French manufacture.

Notwithstanding the fact that former colonial army soldiers served in the ALN as instructors,39 and despite the acculturation to the colonial army since the draft had been established in , this mimicry was no less ironic. It can be interpreted as either revenge on, or an homage to, the enemy army that the ALN looked to for inspiration in the hopes of being victorious.

Military virtues were explicitly downplayed in favour of political engagement. However, on the ground, these virtues were indispensable even though the expected consequences of this army waging guerrilla warfare were in fact political. Major geographic areas were designated, and in spring , several texts illustrated a strong determination to set common rules.

This platform specified the principles of the independence struggle and its organisation. At every echelon, responsibilities were divided into three areas political, military and intelligence and decisions were made collectively. Nevertheless, when it became an urgent matter for survival, the military aspect predominated. Assignments were fixed and were carried out; orders circulated and were obeyed; punishments were handed down based on the echelon and were actually carried out; soldiers were paid monthly—these are all signs of a properly functioning army in which the principle of authority was implemented and any protest was punished severely.

Civilians were at the service of the maquisards and were incorporated into the FLN as moussebiline. Allowances were paid to the families of activists and combatants to assist pregnant women or widows, along a pre-established scale. However, the course of the war would make these principles hard to apply. On the ground, the ALN came first and actions were guided by military imperatives. When a political dimension could be accommodated, it would be.

However, beginning in , when the full force of French repression came down on the ALN, its needs took priority. With the fighters from the earliest days out of the picture, the military dimension took precedence: at that stage, the maquisards were less politicised and received less training when they joined the maquis.

The structure still existed, but necessity forced the units to break up into small groups. Thus, the ALN survived until the end of the war, offering up an expected level of resistance to the French forces. Nevertheless, repression was very strong, focused primarily on separating civilians from the maquisards by displacing nearly two million rural civilians into camps, whereas vast stretches of territory were declared off limits where violators could be shot on sight.

As such, contacts between the ALN and civilians became much more difficult and dangerous in the last three years of the war. Yet until the very end, civilians—especially women—continued to support the maquis by concealing maquisards and giving them food and care. While the Algerian population was not unanimously united—no more than any other group in wartime—this commitment alongside the maquisards is a clear sign that civilians recognised their role and gave meaning to their actions.

Colonisation acted as a deeply destabilising factor in colonised countries. This was especially true in Algeria, where colonisation coincided with the arrival of a large number of European settlers. Rebuilding the Community? Throughout the war, tax collectors enforced this obligation. Refusal to pay the tax would incur penalties that could go as far as capital punishment.

Locally, this same unification trend was at work. The maquisards affirmed the existence of solidarity among Algerians. This solidarity was the justification for them to be protected, aided and approved, but especially, the very existence of the maquis meant the existence of an Algerian people. The ALN was the Algerian people. When it could be picked up in the maquis, the Voice of the Arabs radio, broadcast towards Algeria, told of the events of the war across Algerian territory.

This propaganda, aimed at bolstering the morale of the maquisards and the civilians who would hear these stories, was largely fictional in terms of the number of enemies killed, the weapons used or the battles won.

BRANCHE In the secure zones that they could occasionally establish during the war, the maquisards were able to unfurl this new, purified community that they were prepared to die for. Thus, in the mountainous Ouarsenis region in July , Matteo Rotta witnessed a military parade of three companies, followed by a celebration in the middle of a clearing. A fellagha47 stood watch over all these items while the auxiliaries went to join the singing and dancing, adding a note of sober cheer to this event.

The world they envisioned had to be not only imaginable but also desirable for a majority of Algerians. Yet the aim was not to ground the nation in Islam, as the ulamas of the s had proclaimed, with their focus on restoring proper Islam. Islam also provided a common language that transcended linguistic, regional or social differences. He was then asked to lead the prayer…. The distinctions were not broken down so easily, but the distance between the maquisards and the civilians serving them was reduced.

Here the time for combat has come. The countryman must understand; halt the misery. May God take the fallen man into his mercy, he will go to paradise. The struggle against dissidence was therefore fundamental.

This requirement led to trials by revolutionary tribunals, with individuals convicted of treason being executed. Under torture, some men confirmed the accusations whereas others resisted; all were executed, and wilaya 3 was stripped of some of its most capable fighters and officers.

Suspicion was the general rule. This demand of absolute loyalty also led to violence against ALN members or civilians. The humiliation involved forcing him to kill his own dog. This was a frequent request of the maquisards: they wanted to be able to travel in villages without dogs giving them away. Although this request was painful for the inhabitants, it had to be obeyed.

Here, the effect was the opposite of what was most likely anticipated. The French were foreigners; to interact with the villagers, they depended on interpreters or soldiers in their ranks who spoke the local language. More broadly, during military operations, they were seldom able to pick out individuals.

Unlike the French Army, which applied collective responsibility on Algerian villagers which it viewed as a single bloc , the ALN preferred targeted violence. From the French Army, an individual could fear being the victim of violence that was arbitrary or was levied indiscriminately against the group,59 whereas from the ALN, he could mainly fear being accused of a specific attitude.

As such, contrary to the view of the French Army, two similar forces were not weighing on Algerian civilians. The outside force was clearly identified and foreign, whereas the other internal force shared many characteristics with the civilian population. However, this shared identity was not uniform, and not all Algerians were ready to stand behind the FLN and to recognise themselves in it.

Bringing this community into existence required a combination of conviction and pressure. Indeed, the ALN acted as an avenger, intervening in disputes and claiming to right wrongs. In particular, this is the kind of argument it used to exert pressure on the more fortunate, by insisting on the fact that it was helping the most wretched.

Honourable Bandits? To do so, [the honourable bandit] punishes misdeeds in his own group and fends off [those who] would like to hunt on his territory without respecting his ethical rules. Nevertheless, there were many shared features that attest to the possible paths open to those who wished to join the maquis and oppose France. As soon as the first fighters from November had been killed by the French Army, it could not have regenerated and grown without the support and participation of the rural Algerian population.

In this sense, the maquisards were sometimes attributed certain qualities—including symbolic or even magical ones—of honourable bandits. Honour, in this case, carries its full relational dimension: an honourable gesture must be made publicly and approved by the public. It refers to a social order that it helps to preserve, as Pierre Bourdieu noted with regard to Kabylia. For this to occur, they had to act on behalf of an order rooted in two different and ideally convergent sources: the traditional rural values and resistance to colonial rule.

Attacking the representatives of the colonial order was one way to bring both value systems into alignment. BRANCHE harvests, killing French farmers or destroying orchards were other ways to meet these injunctions: the ALN thus offered men the possibility to bear arms and to destroy what colonisation had built at the expense of their own families. The targets of violence had to be specific and justified. But it was unable to translate this determination into local terms, and it lacked the resources to enforce this radical constraint on behaviour.

Compromises were necessary for an authoritarian organisation whose presence and support were unevenly spread across Algeria. Thus, it helped make visible what James C. The fact that— until the very end—there were armed men to resist and civilians to conceal them illustrates that there was a symbiosis that went further than a convergence of interests. The maquisards were the honourable men who brought the national community into existence. The resistance also emerged within a colonial world that had been in existence for generations.

Algeria had been French territory for more than a century. Its inhabitants were marked by colonialism and largely acculturated to the colonial system and especially the colonial army. They chose forms of resistance that actualised their goal of seizing power for the Algerian people. The new world would not be a blank page gradually revealing the hidden text of a dominated society. Rural Algerian society left its mark on the way the fighters were organised and added to the numerous specific features of the struggle that we have sketched out in this chapter.

These ties only existed because the fighters were from the Algerian population and could find enough support to survive: all ties with outside assistance had been virtually cut off, the French Army had set up a gigantic displacement plan for rural Algerians, and it had focused on methodically crushing the maquis.

However, after the ceasefire, the maquisards from inside Algeria benefited less from independence than those who had organised outside the country, where an armed force had gradually taken shape. The ANP was organised as a regular army, separate from civilians. Whoever controlled this army would hold power. They brought the new Algerian state the structured population built up patiently over several years, which had already partly taken over from the colonial state.

Lakhdar Bouragaa, Les hommes de Mokorno, privately published by the author, undated, p.

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